











Victor A.Ogurtsov,  
 Business Economics, Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN, Wageningen University, The 
Netherlands, 
victor.ogurtsov@wur.nl 
 Marcel A.P.M. van Asseldonk 
Institute for Risk Management in Agriculture, Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN, Wageningen 
University, The Netherlands, 
marcel.vanasseldonk@wur.nl 
Ruud B.M. Huirne 
Animal  Institute for Risk Management in Agriculture, Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN, 












Paper prepared for presentation at the  99
th EAAE Seminar ‘Trust and Risk in 





Copyright 2006 by[Ogurtsov, van Asseldonk and Huirne]. All rights reserved.  Readers 
may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, 
provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. Victor Ogurtsov  et al.  297
Factors Explaining Farmers’ Insurance Purchase in the Dutch Dairy Sector
Victor A.Ogurtsov1, Marcel A.P.M. van Asseldonk2, Ruud B.M. Huirne3
 1Business Economics, Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN, Wageningen University, The Netherlands, 
2Institute for Risk Management in Agriculture, Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN, Wageningen 
University, The Netherlands, 
3Animal  Institute for Risk Management in Agriculture, Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN, 
Wageningen University, The Netherlands, 
 victor.ogurtsov@wur.nl, marcel.vanasseldonk@wur.nl,  ruud.huirne@wur.nl
Abstract
This paper analyzed the impact of farm and farmer characteristics on the acceptability to dairy
farmers in the Netherlands of an all-risk insurance package and underlying specific categories
of insurance coverage. The major farm characteristics considered were structural, operational
and financial variables, while farmer age was the major farmer-specific characteristic ana-
lyzed. The specific insurance categories reviewed were damage, legal, disability, liability and
health insurance. The results suggest that there are common and insurance-specific factors that
can improve the design of insurance policies for dairy farmers. 
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1.   Introduction
Farmers often face risky situations in agriculture. A risk means the possibility of a loss of
income or property (Pritchet et al., 1996). Farm risks can be divided into business and financial
risks. Business risk is related to production, price, institutional and personal risk. Financial risk
results from the method of financing and is related to the debts and equity of the farm
(Hardaker et al., 2004). To cope with risks, farmers may apply risk management strategies,
such as farm financing, diversification, insurance, or spot and futures marketing contracts
(Hardaker et al., 2004). Insurance is frequently used to cover against the financial conse-
quences of many risks (Pritchet et al., 1996). Many studies have been done to describe
farmer’s actual insurance purchase factors (e.g. Mishra and Goodwin, 2003; Sherrick et al.,
2004; Mishra et al., 2005), or to predict a farmers’ demand for insurance (Van Asseldonk et al.,
2002). In these studies the factors were divided into farm and farmers’ personal characteristics.
The farm characteristics analyzed referred to financial, structural and operational variables.
Farmer-specific characteristics were risk perception, risk attitude, farmer age, education, ten-
ure, previous risk exposure and the experience level of the farmer. 
Previous studies were of high importance for describing the impact of variables affecting the
purchase of insurance. Studies of specific risks (e.g. Ganderton et al., 2000; Van Asseldonk et
al., 2002; Kunreuther and Pauly, 2004) have focused on perils like hail, storm and flood, while
those devoted to specific types of insurance on farms have mostly dealt with the purchase of
crop insurance (e.g. Mishra and Goodwin, 2003; Sherrick et al., 2004; Mishra et al., 2005;298   Factors Explaining Farmers’ Insurance Purchase in the Dutch Dairy Sector
Goodwin et al., 2004). Those studies were conducted using the subjective data from decision
makers obtained either from real experiments or questionnaires. Due to subjective source of
data the results could be different from the data obtained from observed economic behaviour.
That studies are of high importance for insurance policies about specific risks. The variables
may be significant for one type of insurance, but may have a different impact or be not signifi-
cant for the other. That makes problematic to make insurance policy, which is often based on
general guideline for different insurance types. Farmer is insured from many risks at the same
time with different insurance policies. Using the data from observed economic behaviour is
possible to analyze the actual purchase of different insurance types in order to improve insur-
ance policy-making. 
By analyzing all insurance policies that a farmer follows it is possible to come to the aggre-
gated measure of insurance. The farmer is faced with the whole set of risks, and he should opt
for an integrated risk-management strategy in which all business and financial risks are evalu-
ated in a portfolio context and related to the farmer’s risk attitude. No published examples have
been found of a whole-farm perspective used to analyze a farmer’s decisions about the pur-
chase of all-risk insurance package. 
The goal of this paper was to make an empirical analysis of actual insurance purchase from
observed economic behaviour to improve the policy-making of insurers. The impacts of vari-
ables described in the previously mentioned studies were estimated empirically in a whole-
farm context to gain a perspective on the purchase of all-risk insurance package consisting of
accident, damage, disability, liability, legal, life, health and combined insurance categories.
The models with the same set of variables used for the all-risk insurance were also estimated in
a partial context for the separate insurance categories. On the basis of similarities and differ-
ences between purchases of insurance types the recommendations to improve insurance poli-
cies will be made. 
The paper is organized as follows. First the conceptual model, estimation procedure, available
data and variables used for the empirical models are introduced. Then the results of the models
will be described. The paper finishes with the main conclusions.
 
2.   Conceptual model, data and estimation
Conceptual model
The conceptual model is presented on the basis of previous studies and available data (see Fig-
ure 1). Purchase of insurance was assumed to be influenced by both farm characteristics and
the farmer’s personal characteristics. Farm characteristics were divided into structural vari-
ables that usually can change only in the long-term, operational variables that can change in
the short term, and financial variables that have both long- and short-term characteristics. The
expected sign of the impact of these variables on the amount of premium paid is shown in
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* positive (+) and negative (-) signs mean positive or negative impact on the amount of premium paid; ** a ques-
tion mark (?) means the sign of the variable is not given in the literature or inconclusive                        
Figure 1. Conceptual model
From the structural variables the analysis was conducted with size variables ESU1 -  (European
size units),total balance sheet value of the farm, revenue, proportion of rented land to total area
and a regional dummy variable (1- South, 0 – North).
The analyzed operational variables were productivity, operational expenses, proportion of
grassland, McSharry2 compensation from European Union and net-farm result.
The financial variables that might have an impact on insurance purchase were off-farm
income, debt-to-equity ratio, long- and short-term debt and the amount of available liquid cap-
ital. The analyzed farmer characteristic was the age of a farmer.
Data
The Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) cross-sectional dataset from Landbouw Econo-
misch Instituut (LEI) for 2001 on 240 specialized dairy farms was used. 
The FADN data is an official European Union dataset consisting of information per farm. This
dataset includes detailed information about all agricultural sectors. The limitation is that the
insurance data is not that much detailed as the rest data about production and results. The
descriptive statistics of variables is presented in Table 1.
1. A European Size Unit (ESU) is a measure of the economic size of a farm business based on the gross margin calcu-
lated from standard coefficients for each commodity on the farm. 1 ESU roughly corresponds to 1.3 hectares/ha of cereals or 1 
dairy cow (see http://statistics.defra.gov.uk/esg/asd/fbs/sub/europe_size.htm).
2. A form of price compensations to agricultural products in European Union and UK (for details see ‘’McSharry’’ 





Financial variables Structural variables
-  ESU (+) 
-  Share of rented land (+) 
-  Balance sheet value (?) 
-  Productivity (+) 
-  Compensations (+) 
-  Operational expenses (?) 
-  Off-farm income (+) 
-  Debt use  (+) 
-  Liquid capital (-) 
-  Farmer’s age 
(+) 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the model variables for dairy sector
The data was corrected by weighted factor to represent the whole population of Dutch dairy
farmers.
The all-risk insurance package consists of premiums paid for accident, damage, disability,
legal, liability, life, health and combined insurance. The description of these categories is pre-
sented further (see Pritchet et al., 1996). Accident insurance provides coverage in case of an
unplanned, unexpected and underwritten event which occurs suddenly and at a definite place.
Damage insurance protects in case of fire, storm or flooding resulting in property damage.
Disability insurance covers when a person is unable to perform one or more work because of
serious injury or illness. Legal insurance provides coverage for losses incurred due to court
actions (but excluding criminal matters). Liability insurance protects against loss arising from
legal liability for injuries to other persons or damage to their property. Life insurance provides
payment of a specified amount at the insured person’s/beneficiary’s death, or at a specified
date. Health insurance is insurance against loss due to sickness or bodily injury. Combined
("combi") insurance is a combination of the above policies (issued by one of the insurers,
without further information from the FADN database on the amount of coverage per category).
As can be seen from Table 1, 30.3% of dairy farmers have accident insurance, while most
Variables Variable description Mean % SD
Insurance variables
prem Total premium paid, Euro 6251 3342
accident Premium paid, Euro/participation (in %) 51 30.3 175
combi Premium paid, Euro/participation (in %) 375 25.7 969
damage Premium paid, Euro/participation (in %) 1666 93.8 1150
disability Premium paid, Euro/participation (in %) 1317 68.9 1699
legal Premium paid, Euro/participation (in %) 152 54.8 203
liability Premium paid, Euro/participation (in %) 886 90.0 768
life Premium paid, Euro/participation (in %) 888 65.1 1379
health Premium paid, Euro/participation (in %) 916 88.8 945
Structural variables
ESU Number of European size units 112 32
balsh Total assets value, Euro 2023571 794927
grinused Share of grassland in used area 0.76
cows  Number of cows per 1 ha of grassland 60 18
rev Total revenues, Euro 199358 68182
arusintot Share of used area in total area 0.34
Province (1-South; 0-North) 22
Operational variables
mcsh McSharry  compensation,  Euro 3752 3710
nfr  Net farm result excl. insurance, Euro -22648 40488
feed Feed cost, Euro 33552 18853
Financial variables
ffi  Family farm income, Euro 53421 34087
liq  Liquid capital, Euro 46210 140392
ltd  Long-term debt, Euro 371497 273547
std Short-term  debt,  Euro 5954 38780
ofi  Off-farm income, Euro 6506 11804
Leverage Debt-to-equity ratio, % 81 36
Farmer specific variables
age Age of a farmer, years 51 11Victor Ogurtsov  et al.  301
farmers have damage, disability, liability and health insurance (neglecting the impact of the
combi insurance). Farmers also pay the highest premiums for these insurance types. The low-
est premiums farmers pay for combi and accident insurance. Combi insurance is issued only by
one insurance company and comprises a number of different insurance categories. 
Data estimation
As dependent variable, the total premium paid for an all-risk insurance package (total premium
paid) was used and also the amount of premium paid for below mentioned categories. The total
premium paid was calculated as the sum of premiums paid for accident, damage, disability,
legal, liability, life, health and combined insurance. 
The estimation of the regression coefficients covered the following steps. To solve a potential
dependency problem, the variables were checked for multicollinearity. The variables operating
expenses and dairy productivity were omitted due to high correlation with net farm result. The
number of cows and milk quota were highly correlated with ESU and therefore eliminated
from the analysis in favour of ESU as the size variable. The regressions were made by OLS
estimation in Stata 8 SE. All models initially had a constant, but subsequently constants were
excluded because they were not significant in all models. Then the regressions for specific
insurance types and the total premium paid for all-risk insurance were estimated. 
3. Results and discussion
The results are presented for the models analyzing all-risk insurance package and five main
insurance categories – damage, legal, disability, liability and health insurance. The models for
these categories fitted the data well (see Table 2). For those insurance categories farmer partic-
ipation was the highest, and the farmers paid the highest premiums. The results for the other
categories are not presented due to a poor model fit, which also corresponded to lower partici-
pation of farmers in those insurance policies.
The size variable ESU was significant at the 1% level for the all-risk insurance package and
the rest insurance categories and had a positive impact on buying insurance. The positive
impact was also observed for other size variables, such as a number of cows, revenue and bal-
ance sheet value of the farm. This was according to expectation and the results of Goodwin et
al. (2004) and Sherrick et al. (2004). Increased farm size is a cause of purchasing more insur-
ance because a farmer takes more risk due to growth (Goodwin et al., 2004; Sherrick et al.,
2004). The proportion of rented land was expected to have a positive relation the amount of
insurance premium paid as in a study of Sherrick et al. (2004), where they interpreted it as that
farmers who have relatively more rented land can be expected to rely more on commercial
insurance than self-insurance (Sherrick et al., 2004). In our models this variable was not signif-
icant.302   Factors Explaining Farmers’ Insurance Purchase in the Dutch Dairy Sector
Table 2. Main variables explaining insurance purchase by dairy farmers
The regional variable was a Dutch specific variable differentiating farmers on the North from
farmers on the South. It was significant at 1% and had a positive impact on the amount of pre-
mium paid for damage, disability and all-risk insurance package. That confirms the expecta-
tions about differences in insurance behaviour: farmer on the South purchases more insurance
coverage than a farmer on the North.
Net farm result was eliminated from the models due to multicollinearity. From correlation
matrixes net farm result was highly negatively correlated with amount of premium paid for
damage and liability insurance while for the other insurance categories and all-risk insurance
package at whole it was not significant. The negative impact on the mentioned insurance cate-
gories could be explained by behavioural terms: farmers who earn more from core activities
should have less demand for insurance. In order to explore relationship of the money got by
farmers from non-core activities the focus will be on off-farm income and McSharry compen-
sation variables. From operational expenses variables used in previous studies the feed costs
were analyzed, but the clear relationship was not found by Mishra et al. (2005). In our models,
as net-farm result, feed costs were omitted due to multicollinearity, but in correlation matrixes
they were highly positively correlated with purchase of damage insurance and all-risk insur-
ance package. The result confirmed our expectations that farmers that have more operational
expenses due to higher specialization and size are needed to be insured more because it is more
risky than for diversified farmers. As a form of compensations got from the government
(through EU) McSharry compensations were analyzed. We did not analyzed deficiency, disas-
ter or conservation reserve payments for their participation in government programs as Mishra
and Goodwin (2003). The assumption was that if a farmer gets additional compensations from
the government in implicit or explicit form he would be more willing to spend that money for
insurance. The available data was concerned to existing in European Union form of McSharry
compensation. The results confirmed that expectations with respect to purchase of damage
D am age   Legal   D isability   Liability   H ealth   A ll-risk  
Vari ables 
Param eter value  St. error  Param eter 
value  St. error  Param eter 
value  St. error  Param eter 
value  St. error  Param eter 
value  St. error  Param eter 
value  St. error 
Structural 
variables                      
ESU 11.6***  1.8  1.0***  0.31  13.2***  3.6  3.6***  1.2  4.6***  1.5  (+)***     
Num ber  of  cows  (+)***      (+)***       (+)***    (+)***     
Revenue  (+)***                (+)***     
Balance sheet 
value (+)***                (+)***    (+)***     
Proportion of 
rented  land   (+)***                      
Region (1-South; 
0 - North)  456.4***  161.9      718**  303        1184**  465 
O perational 
variables                          
Net farm  result 
(excl insur.)  (-)***    0.0001  0.0005    (-)***            
Revenue-cost 
ratio                      
Mc Sha r r y 
compensation 0.04**  0.02                  0.14***  0.05 
Feed costs  (+)***                    (+)***    
Proportion of 
grassland               337.6  269.4      
Financial 
variables                      
Off-farm  income      0.001  0.001     0.01***  0.004    0.05***  0.02 
Liquid  capital                      
Long-term   debt  (+)***                (+)***     
Short-term  debt                     
Debt-equity-ratio 7.8***  1.8 2.2*** 0.50 12.3***  3.6  2.7**  1.3 3.5**  1.7  (+)***     
Farmer personal 
variables                      
Age  -8.6** 4.1     -15.0*  8.1  5.8**  3.0      -6.7  11.0 
Adj usted R-
square  0.78  0.74 0.59 0.67  0.58 0.83 
Sample size  225  131  165  215  213  240 
*, **, *** - significant at 10%, 5% or 1% 
level                  
A sterix w ithout coefficient is related to significant variables not included in the m odel due to m ulticollinearity;        
 (+) - positive im pact on dependent vari-
able                 
 (-) - negative impact on dependent vari-
able                 
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insurance and all-risk insurance package as a whole as well. Farmers receiving more insurance
subsidies have an incentive to buy more insurance (Mishra and Goodwin, 2003).
Again, due to multicollinearity, the proportion of grassland was not added in the models, but
from correlation tables it had a highly positive correlation with amount of total premium paid.
This confirmed the expectation that farmers insure more if they have higher production due to
greater use of grassland. 
Off-farm income was significant at the 1% level for purchase of liability insurance and all-
risk insurance package. This finding was consistent to our expectations, but not consistent with
previous studies. Our expectation was that farmers are more prone to spend money for insur-
ance if they get additional incomes. When deciding to purchase an insurance, a person will
consider if there are other sources of payment (Harrington and Niehaus, 1999, p.150) Accord-
ing to the previous studies about crop insurance, farmers having more off-farm income are
likely to self-insure, so they could afford to use less commercial insurance (Ganderton et al.,
2000; Mishra and Goodwin, 2003; Sherrick et al., 2004). Liquid capital was expected to have
a negative impact as in studies of (Ganderton et al., 2000; Mishra and Goodwin, 2003; Sher-
rick et al., 2004), who argued that if a farmer has more liquid capital (i.e. wealth) he would be
more willing to self-insure. On the other hand, the insurance literature suggest, the wealthier
people (or in our case farmers) are likely to purchase higher property (i.e. accident and damage
insurance) and liability insurance because the values of assets owned are likely to be higher
(Harrington and Niehaus, 1999, p.159). In our model the amount of liquid capital was not sig-
nificant, and also in correlation matrixes was not highly correlated with insurance variables. As
debt variables, long-term, short-term debt and debt-equity ratio were analyzed. The better
results were obtained by using debt-to-equity ratio. The variable was significant with at 1%
and had a positive impact on the amount of all analyzed insurance categories and all-risk insur-
ance package as well. That has according to our expectations and similar to the results by
(Ganderton et al., 2000; Mishra and Goodwin, 2003; Mishra et al.; Sherrick et al., 2004). In
order to have more lawns from the bank, it is often required from the bank to be insured to sta-
bilize farm liquidity and avoid a risk of going bankrupt. Lenders will demand compensation
for investing in firm with higher probability of financial distress. In this respect if a farmer can
reduce a risk through insurance, lenders will be willing to contract the farm at better terms
(Harrington and Niehaus, 1999, p.157). On the other hand, a farmer also realizes that default
risk, and he has more responsibility for the money that does not belong to him.
The age of a farmer was significant at 5% for purchase of damage and liability insurance and at
10% for purchase disability insurance. For purchase of liability insurance the age had a posi-
tive impact. This is in accordance with expectations and the results from previous studies.
Insurance users thought to be relatively older (Sherrick et al., 2004). Age can also be an indica-
tor of the experience of the farmer, and in this respect, should have a positive impact on buying
insurance (Mishra et al., 2005). For purchase of damage and disability insurance age had an
opposite negative impact. In those categories dairy farmers have high insurance participation
(94% for damage and 69% for disability insurance). That could be related to experience of
older farmers that they pay premiums but do not use benefits of that insurance. The answer
could be found in insurance literature: the payment of premium when a loss does not occur
hurts individuals less than the benefit that they receive from having the insurer pay the part of
the loss (Harrington and Niehaus, 1999, p.147). In this respect farmers could be willing to pay
less for damage and disability insurance.304   Factors Explaining Farmers’ Insurance Purchase in the Dutch Dairy Sector
4. Conclusions
The goal of this paper was to investigate whether there are common or specific variables influ-
encing purchase of different insurance types by Dutch dairy farmers. There were similarities
and differences between variables playing a role in decisions about insurance purchase. For
considered insurance categories and all-risk insurance package as well, all variables, except the
age, had the same direction of impact. There were found common variables that influence pur-
chase of all considered insurance types and all-risk insurance package as well. That concerned
to the size of the farm and debt-to-equity ratio. This suggests that with respect to size and
financial situation about debt the insurance policy makers should follow the general rules. The
other variables were found to have a significant impact on the purchases of specific insurance
types.
With respect to specific insurance implications, the following patterns were observed for spe-
cific insurance types. For the purchase of damage insurance that is related mainly to insurance
agricultural means of production (buildings, sheds, tractors, etc.) insurance policy makers need
to look almost at all analyzed farm variables – size, region, net-farm result, compensations,
feed costs, debt-to-equity ratio - and age as well. In legal insurance many of non-farm objects
and activities were insured, but anyway, the developers of insurance products need to focus on
main farm characteristics, such as size and financial situation with respect to debt use. Disabil-
ity insurance was related to disability risk of farm operator, and in this respect the recommen-
dation to makers of insurance products are focused on farm (core characteristics), as size,
regional location, use of debt and also to the age of a farmer. Liability insurance is related to
farm and non-farm activities, so the insurance policy-makers need to consider the size, the
financial results from core activities (net-farm result), non-core activities (off-farm income),
use of debt and farmer’s age as well. Health insurance was not mainly related to agricultural
activities, but still, as also in case of legal insurance, the insurers need to look at the general
variables size and use of debt. From the last model analyzing all-risk insurance package, we
can conclude, if the insurer thinks generally about the factors that influence the insurance pur-
chase by a dairy farmer he always needs to keep in mind the size of perspective or existing cli-
ent (i.e. a dairy farmer) and his financial situation. In order to switch from the general view to
specific insurance policies he needs consider additional farm factors, as regional location, the
financial flow of farmer’s compensation, his operational expenses for feed and also the poten-
tial income from non-farm activities. 
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